

OUTGOING

Safe Areas

031108A UC

CZN-727 OK

MOST IMMEDIATE

CZG-540

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

93 JUN-3 11:36

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*

DATE : 3 JUNE 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 703

SUBJECT : SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS ON "SAFE AREA"

CODED CABLE

1. The content of the draft resolution included in your MSC 896, as you generally pointed out, would have a major impact on UNPROFOR in both B-H and by extension Croatia and I found it to be urgent to answer your cable.
2. A number of areas are of critical concern.
3. The first one, as you indicated is in operative para 5. If one allowed no controls of the military or paramilitary units of the Bosnian government (= Muslim forces), one would create a scenario which would encourage the use of safe areas as havens where forces could refit, re-arm, train and prepare for further military operations. The history of the Vietnam conflict immediately comes to mind. This is why we had included control mechanisms in our proposed concept for implementation of safe areas, my Z-614 refers. It is a necessity to change this para.
4. The second area of concern, which you also identified in your cable concerns operative para 9. As you correctly stated a clear distinction must be made as to what UNPROFOR is authorized to do and obliged to do. We have ample evidence of deliberate provocation, the events of last weekend in Sarajevo being only one, which bring heavy

DISTRIBUTION:	
GA	LO
JW	DL
SC	PS
BN	PH

1/3

NYK-031120Z

retaliation. UNPROFOR, should it ever be given the authority to take necessary measures, including the use of force, would require the authority to use forces against whatever party provokes military action. I am sure this was not in the mind of the author of the draft resolution.

5. The third area of concern is the perception that the use of air power could simply be added as a further tool for UNPROFOR to use in the accomplishment of its mandate. We have indicated in our correspondence over the months that air strikes would simply bring UNPROFOR and UNHCR operations to an end. I am enclosing a letter from Karadic which has been included in previous correspondence as a reminder of the Bosnian Serb position on this option.
6. Operative para 7.a. refers to adjustments to UNPROFOR elements in order to meet the demand of the draft resolution. The Security Council must be made aware that available forces are currently stretched to the breaking point with the resources deployed in Srebrenica and Zepa. Support to convoy operations cannot be increased. Therefore over and above requesting TCN to agree to a change of mandate for their deployed forces, time for funding and deployment of further forces must be factored in any resolution to ensure realism is not lost in good intentions. It must therefore be made clear that neither we nor the Secretary General can report back to the Security Council within a week of the passage of a resolution as to how it would be implemented unless we have a clear commitment of resources. This would then allow the formulation of a deployment plan and an implementation time scale. It is better if the resolution were to be divided into two steps: first preparation resolution, then execution resolution.

7. As to advice on additional) contingents, a separate cable will follow as the inclusion of air power and the authority to use force to ensure freedom of movement is an entirely new approach. If one had the assured cooperation of all parties, minimum but still substantial forces would be required. However the declared Bosnian Serb intentions would make it impossible to deploy troops under such a mandate.
8. In conclusion I doubt if the current TCN would agree to leave their contingents in UNPROFOR under the proposed mandate. One simply cannot make peace and war at the same time.

Internal Distribution: SRSG, DCM

CN2476 P2/3

Dr Radovan Karadzic

Handwritten notes and stamps: "75M 21.53", "P.S.", "LX", "75 1/2", "16 December 1992."

From The Leader Of The Bosnian Serbs

Dr Butros Butros-Ghali
Secretary General
The United Nations
NEW YORK
USA

Handwritten notes: "MA", "we should send this to UN peacekeepers but into 75 1/2"

16 December 1992.

Dear Secretary General

I hope that you have had a chance to see my Press statement issued yesterday evening regarding the current proposals for action to enforce the no fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

You will have intelligence reports gathered not only from ground based monitors but via other means, which indicate clearly that there have been no combat missions flown over Bosnia-Herzegovina by either the Bosnian-Serbs or the Croatian Air Force since 13 October 1992.

You will understand therefore the degree of alarm that has been caused, particularly in the Parliament of the Republic of Srpska over the sudden urgency that has been attached to destroying aircraft that "defy" the no fly zone.

Such actions cannot possibly help anybody on the ground and will not save a single life. The use of aircraft is not a factor in the continuation of this war or the intensity of its bloodshed.

Indeed our helicopter flights tend to be for the transportation of the sick and wounded who will die unless moved to more suitable medical premises.

Rather than pursuing this great step I would like to recommend an urgent review of the mechanisms by which we monitor the content of aircraft in order that the United Nations can be completely confident of the humanitarian nature of such flights.

It is not always possible to inform the authorities prior to departure of helicopter flights, due to their nature. In the event of heavy casualties it is often necessary to take off and fly immediately in order to save lives.

X I have to say to you that if it is decided that the UN Security Council Resolution should be enforced by the use of force and that this results in the destruction of our helicopters, the Parliament of the Republic of Srpska will almost certainly declare all UN Forces as hostile.

contd...

CZN-727

5/5
019
2002

UNITED NATIONS
INTERNATIONAL

HQS NEW YORK

10-12-17 23:52 5803
10:12 AM 20:02

CN2476

P:3

(C)

Should this happen, and it would be a regressive thing, I think that we should have contingency arrangements to evacuate all UN ground troops currently serving in the Serbian-controlled parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina as quickly as possible. For it would not be possible for us to guarantee their safety in the light of the popular revolt which we can anticipate from our people.

The influence of the Bosnian-Serb leadership over individual units on the ground, in the event of UN military action would be limited and our prime concern would be to ensure that UN personnel could be evacuated promptly and safely. We would naturally formally have to request such forces to leave and our consensus for their presence as part of a humanitarian force would have to be removed.

I have written to Prime Minister Major along these lines.

Yours sincerely

Radovan Karadzic

Dr Radovan Karadzic

